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ABSTRACT
We address the causes behind the significant drop in natural gas production in
the 2000s in Argentina, starting from a basic supply model that depends on eco-
nomic incentives, and adding control variables related to different potential ex-
planations such as firm specific (or area specific) behavior and the role of con-
tractual renegotiation of concessions extensions. Results from a panel data of
production areas between 2003 and 2013 show that once a basic supply-past
production (or reserve) relationship is modeled, other often mentioned effects
become non-significant. Chiefly among them are firm specific effects that were
used as a central argument for the nationalization of YPF in 2012. Rather, the
evidence shows that the observed downcycle conforms to the prediction of a
simple model of depressed economic incentives acting upon mature conventional
natural gas fields and hindering investment in reserve additions or new technol-
ogies. The results are robust to the nationalization of YPF, after which aggregate
production continued a downward trend for two years, although are insufficient
to capture an ongoing reconfiguration of incentives and risks in the forthcoming
transition to shale gas production.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Argentina became, in the last quarter of the past century, an important producer of natural
gas after some important discoveries of conventional resources in Patagonia. The country followed
a rapid and economy-wide substitution in residential and commercial segments, the industrial sector,
electricity generation and even transport. Indeed, it has been recognized as part of the group of
countries used to illustrate a fast and deep penetration process of natural gas (see Hansen and
Percebois, 2010, chapter 4). At the beginning of the 2000s natural gas had a share well above 50%
in the primary energy mix and several exports projects mainly to neighbor countries (mainly Chile)
were set to take up to 20% of domestic production. More than two decades ago, an evaluation
mission by the World Bank (1990) commended the important substitution to natural gas performed
by the country, but alerted that unless supply could evolve rapidly too, there could be problems in
attending all segments of demand (including exports). The report even conjectured that if the status
quo they were observing extended into the future, the country could hit a critical reserve-production
ratio in 2002. This prediction actually happened, but with the unfortunate coincidence of a large
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Figure 1: Argentina: Natural Gas Production and Consumption 2003–2013
Note: In million m3, production (solid line), consumption (dotted line)
Source: IAPG and Enargas
1. Price controls were asymmetric in the sense of being too strong in electricity and natural gas and less restrictive or
relatively soft in other segments. In the case of LPG (the main substitute for natural gas for households—about 33%—
without access to natural gas) higher prices led to very different and testable behavior of demand (e.g., Navajas, 2009).
2. This view was officially stated in a government report that justified the expropriation of Repsol (De Vido and Kiciloff,
2012) but had been voiced much earlier. It was also stated in a Federal Agreement on Hydrocarbons signed in February
2012 by the Federal Government and the oil producing Provinces (which, by the 1994 Constitution own hydrocarbon
macroeconomic crisis, an extensive contractual default and the introduction of long-government
intervention in energy markets (see e.g. Pollitt, 2008; Cont et al. 2011). In less than two years, the
country faced an energy-crunch in the natural gas market which led to mandatory export cuts to
Chile, broken contracts (Navajas, 2008) and a command-and-control management of imbalances,
while electricity and natural gas prices were kept frozen for main demand segments.1
Earlier quantitative decompositions of the energy imbalances attributed a central role to
demand (see e.g. Cont and Navajas, 2004), but after peaking in 2004 natural gas production has
been falling consistently. Figure 1 represents the monthly evolution of aggregate natural gas pro-
duction and domestic consumption from 2003 to 2013. The Figure shows that the fall in production
has been matched by a corresponding increase in net imports in order to satisfy domestic demand.
Thus, supply and demand behaved in an unrelated manner during the sample period, both contrib-
uting at different stages to the widening gap covered by a drastic switch in the net export position.
Demand did not show, on this basic accounting, an effect upon supply dynamics, except for demand
shocks years with harsh winters or due a very short and mild recession in 2009. Furthermore, the
nationalization of the leading firm in the gas market (YPF) in early 2012 did not change the observed
underlying dynamics.
Different arguments put forward by academic studies or policy debates have attempted to
explain this phenomenon, depending on the role attributed to firm behavior on the one hand and
the policy or regulatory environment on the other. The government or official view attached the
culprit of the fall in production to the lack of investment efforts by large firms and in particular
YPF (controlled by Repsol since 1999), which ended-up in an expropriation announcement in April
2012.2 Other views regarded the drop in production as the expected evolution of conventional
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resources and are the only power able to grant concessions for exploration and production). Under the umbrella of this
agreement, most Provinces started to suspend and withdraw concessions in many oil and gas areas, with YPF suffering the
strongest hit, amidst a political process that in April led to a government decision to declare a nationalization of YPF through
an expropriation of 51% of the shares of YPF under the control of Repsol.
3. The turnaround from this situation is just beginning and will consolidate in the next decade. Leading this process is
the substantial potential resources of non conventional hydrocarbons that were first recognized in April 2011 by a technical
report prepared for the US Department of Energy (EIA, 2011) and later reconfirmed in a June 2013 report by the Energy
Information Administration (EIA, 2013), both pointing to Argentina as having the second largest potential reservoirs outside
North America. Estimates of (unproven) technically recoverable shale resources, in the case of natural gas, amounted to
802 Tcf (trillion cubic feet) which are equivalent to 21,654 billion of m3 (cubic meters), about 67 times the amount of the
current proven reserves of the country (the magnitude was 11 times in the case of shale oil resources) and 13% of the world
resources identified in the US DOE reports. Uncertainty about these estimates does exist, both in terms of technical and
economically recoverable magnitudes (Di Sbroiavacca, 2013), with some recent more prudent positions that show skepticism
about the degree of profitability associated with initial exploration activities vis a` vis uncertainties surrounding the tax and
overall contractual/governance regime.
natural gas resources beyond the impact of regulatory interventions (Ponzo et al., 2011). Others see
a central responsibility in energy policy either due to earlier planning pitfalls—like the one waved
by the World Bank report mentioned above—or as a contractual disruption in natural gas markets
created by an interventionist paradigm adopted since 2002 (see e.g. Navajas 2008; Recalde, 2011).
Yet other commentators have mentioned strategic market behavior given the dominant role of YPF,
albeit no paper has attempted to model or quantify the argument. Variants of these many explana-
tions put different weights to investment efforts, lack of contractual renegotiation to extend con-
cessions, a too permissive exports program in the late 90s, the under-performance of the major area
(Loma de la Lata), departure from border prices embedded in imports from Bolivia and the like.
However, these effects have not been tested in the received literature, and the empirical support for
many claims relies on casual observation, descriptive statistics or partial relationships that do not
control for other effects and therefore do not fit, in our view, into a credible methodological testing.
Simple evaluations of production performance are not robust since they do not control for the
maturity of areas. Investment performance is endogenous to economic incentives faced by firms.
The observed drop in production is more general than a simple pattern attributed to certain areas
or firms. Besides, strategic (coordinated) behavior explanations require some collusive behavior
that does not fit into observed features such as asymmetries in market shares and excess capacity
in the transport system (see Ivaldi et al., 2003 for structural elements that raise the likelihood of
tacit collusion) or is contradicted by the absence of a policy reaction function that adjust prices to
shortages (strategically engineered by shortages).
All these arguments were stated before the decision to nationalize YPF in early 2012 and
therefore do not consider the empirical evidence on performance that emerged after such drastic
change which was a culmination of several years of interventionism in natural gas markets. As
Figure 1 shows, the evidence of pre and post nationalization performance in natural gas production
in Argentina does not show structural change. Despite government short run expectations, the
decline became more severe after nationalization for both the new YPF but in particular for the rest
of the firms. This more recent evidence tilts the priors in favor of the central argument made in
Barril and Navajas (2011) that associates the drop with depressed economic incentives acting upon
mature conventional natural gas fields and hindering investment in reserve additions or new tech-
nologies. This is particularly important as Argentina was in 2013 just starting up the development
of non-conventional natural gas3 production with YPF now leading that process, after a substantial
correction of price incentives.
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4. Simulations performed by Ponzo et al. (2011) also warn about the prospects of stabilizing production within conven-
tional production processes, but do not stress the move to mobilizing investments in non-conventional (shale gas) production
and instead call for demand management and renewable energy.
5. See for instance Heal and Dasgupta (1979); Krautkraemer (1998); Krautkraemer and Toman (2003) and Medlock
(2009).
6. See Wells (1992) for thorough critical survey of these strategies.
The aim of this paper is to use a basic theoretical framework and empirical modeling so
as to contribute to the scrutiny of the likely factors behind the post 2003 sharp fall in natural gas
supply in Argentina. The importance of clarifying at least some aspects behind recent production
performance is crucial from both positive and normative perspectives. From a positive perspective
we attempt to critically evaluate simple unconditioned arguments that explain aggregate production
as arising from certain areas or firms and show instead that the phenomena is more general and
therefore more market-driven. At a normative level, we hope to contribute to the current energy
policy debate, pointing to economic incentives problems behind the status-quo policy and, while
modeling the performance of conventional natural gas, helping at calling for the urgency to move
towards non-conventional gas development.4
The structure of the paper is the following. In section 2 we provide a basic framework that
we claim should be the starting point from where to refer the empirical evaluation of the drop in
production. We do so by using a simple supply model of a non-renewable natural resource with a
basic framework adapted from the literature (see e.g. Pickering 2008 and Medlock 2009) that allow
us to derive an optimal supply from a producer—that in our representation is constrained by reg-
ulated prices—and is facing a depletion process (as reserves fall) that raises production costs (i.e.
decreases productivity). We do not wish or attempt to proceed to structurally estimate or adjust this
simple model to Argentine data. Instead, we use one main representation—the fact that production
should be seen as conditional on reserves or, equivalently, cumulative past production—as a guid-
ance to specify our empirical research on a large data base constructed for this paper and used for
the first time in an econometric assessment of natural gas production performance in Argentina. In
section 3 we account for the characteristics of our data set—a panel of the change in annual
production of 168 areas of production between 2003 and 2013, the specification of our econometric
equation and the definition and sources of the main variables. Natural gas supply depends on past
accumulated production (or alternatively on remaining reserves) that represents resource depletion
and on a set of controls to capture basin and area heterogeneity, firm effects, investment efforts,
extension of concession contracts, link to an export project and demand effects as a reaction to
winter rationing of industrial customers and electricity generators. Section 4 presents the results of
our econometric testing and discusses the main results. Finally, concluding remarks and suggested
extensions are included in section 5.
2. SUPPLY BEHAVIOR
Alternative strategies to model the behavior of natural gas production depend on the use
of an optimization framework to derive supply in a manner related to the basic theory of exhaustible
resources5 and the explicit modeling of the exploration (drilling and discovery) process that precedes
extraction or production either from geological models or from empirical econometric relation-
ships.6 In this section we sketch a simple model that is based on an explicit optimization and is
simplified to capture the essentials of the factors we perceive as crucial in the particular period of
the Argentine natural gas market that we are studying. Our setting is a workable simplification that
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7. Concentration measures have been relatively stable over our sample, with the HHI falling slightly from 1856 to 1796
in our data set and the CR5 concentration ratio falling from 83.2% to 80.4%. The leading firm at the beginning of the sample
(YPF) lost markets share (from 33.2% to 25.4%) and became the second biggest firm from 2010. Thus, the setting is not
easily represented as one of a dominant firm, in part also for the considerations related to price reaction to a for example
quantity setting oligopoly model. See for example Pickering (2008) for a supply/production performance model under
different market structure in a quantity setting environment. See also Alhajji and Huettner (2000) and previously Griffith
(1985) to model a dominant firm along with a competitive fringe setting in oil markets.
8. See Cont et.al (2011) Table A.1. Natural gas prices were kept frozen in nominal terms for regulated (residential,
commercial and small industrial) segments until November 2008, when a partial de-freeze took place. Average end-user
prices were about 1.3 dollars per MMBTU when a generalized freezing in 2002, after a large currency devaluation, send
them to 0.5 dollars per MMBTU. Partial adjustments in some unregulated segments led average end-user prices to about 2
dollars per MMBTU at the end of our sample, while imports from Bolivia reached 10 dollars and substituting imports of
LNG were above 14 dollars. The fact that seemingly unregulated segments faced prices at most at 3.5 dollars per MMBTU
in such an unbalanced market with excess demand is an indication of the role of imports (made by the government who
absorbed the cost of subsidies) and the overwhelming grip of command and control allocations.
lacks a detailed description of the exploration process and in particular the channel between explo-
ration development and production. This should not be a nuisance given that we are data-constrained
to study these channels, have much less comparative advantage to understand past and current
geological processes and are interested in the final outcome represented by the dynamics of pro-
duction.
Our setting is also very simple compared to more elaborated dynamic optimization models
that allow interactions with price expectations formation and market structure and behavior. This
is also a necessary simplification due to prevailing direct market interventionism, which implies fix
pricing, absence of demand side interactions and diffuse expected parameters. Market structure in
the upstream segment of the natural gas sector in Argentina has been recognized as a concentrated
one since privatization in the mid-1990s (e.g. Petrecolla and Martinez, 2010). However, despite
this inherited market structure,7 a heavy interventionist regime was put in place since 2002, with
open command-and-control features. Prices have been controlled and kept very low in real terms
and in relation to border prices or opportunity cost values (see for example Cont et al. (2011)).8
The excess demand regime (along with excess capacity in the transport system of domestic gas)
that emerged since 2004 has been covered by imports or rationing of some (industrial) customers
in cold winters. Mandatory or forced reallocation of quantities from exports or private sector con-
tracts to regulated segments have been also a central part of an allocative mechanism that superseded
market clearing and intervened in firm decisions. Given all this, price expectations have remained
dominated by the interventionist market regime (particularly due to interventions to contracts be-
tween private parties to redirect quantities to serve regulated segments) and expectations on price
changes in such a regime have been difficult to form. Even recent announcements concerning new
pricing rules for unconventional gas discoveries have been blurred by pervasive potential temporal
inconsistencies in the taxation of natural resources (see Boadway and Keen, 2009). Thus, firms
have been adjusting passively to this regime and despite concentration and oligopoly interactions
there is no room for strategic setting of prices or quantities, as the policy reaction function to the
observed imbalances has been in practice very insensitive so as to avoid price adjustments.
We proceed by assuming three periods, where the current period of interventionism (“1”)
is preceded by a previous period (“0”) of normal market behavior and followed by a future period
(“2”). Past period values (denotes by “0”) are all exogenous and given parameters in the optimi-
zation problem below, which considers only effects in the present (“1”) and in the future (“2”).
Total natural gas resources across periods are defined by Y(IE0,IE1) and depend on initial reserves
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9. This conforms to the observed pattern in Argentina where cuts of exports to Chile and imports from Bolivia and an
LNG facility have contributed to market clearing or rationing has been used as a last resort in the winter season. See Cont
and Navajas (2004) and Navajas (2006) for a quantitative decomposition of the sources of the natural gas demand and
supply imbalance at the beginning of the sample period.
10. As production depends on available resources there is an effect of accumulated past production or diminished reserves
on costs which is negative as it reflects lower productivity from exhaustion of the reservoir, which is implicit in our
formulation. This relationship can be also affected by the management of the reservoir which may also depend on main-
tenance investment activities (i.e. area management investment will diminish the negative effect of cumulative past pro-
duction on current production). We contemplated these effects in the model of an earlier version of this paper but are not
included here as they play a secondary role and are not amenable to testing.
11. This simple model is written in a certainty-equivalent fashion and can accommodate uncertainty in either the cost
of capital and/or in the discount rate. In the latter case see for example Bohn and Deacon (2000) where a risk (probability)
of expropriation acts depressing the discount rate.
12. We have kept a simplified formulation and notation although the model can be written in alternative forms. We
thank an anonymous referee for letting us notice this fact. Starting with reserves R0 and assuming that investment efforts
in period 0 and 1 adds reserves (in periods 1 and 2 respectively) through the functions F1(IE0) and F2(IE1) respectively then
production levels in periods 0, 1 and 2 have to satisfy the restrictions y0≤R0 (1); y1≤R1 = R0 + F1(IE)–y0 (2) and finally
y2 = R1 + F2(IE1)–y1 = R0 + F1(IE0) + F2(IE1)–y0 –y1 (3). This last restriction holds as an equality and can be written as
expression (2) above in the main text with Y(IE0,IE1) = R0 + F1(IE0) + F2(IE1). The explicit inclusion of the other restrictions
on y0 and y1 is avoided because they are not choice variables or in the case of y1 it is assumed to be non-binding.
at the beginning of 0 and exploration efforts driven by past investment IE0 and current (period 1)
investment IE1, which increase available resources in the next period. Aggregate production across
periods will necessarily add up to the resource size, i.e., Y(IE0,IE1) = y0 + y1 + y2. Prices of natural
gas at the wellhead are represented by the vector of past, current and (expected) future prices
(p0,p1,p2e), which are assumed as fixed parameters with no interactions with domestic output equi-
librium, as market clearing is provided from abroad through lower exports or higher imports, or
simply by resorting to demand rationing.9 Prices are assumed the same across areas of production,
which fits into actual conditions. Cost functions associated with production of natural gas are simply
assumed to depend on current production: Ci = Ci(yi) i = 0,1,2..10 Investment spending in period 1
(the only period in which investment is chosen in our model) expands total resources (and therefore
production in period 2) and enters into total costs separately at a cost GE(IE1).
Given this setting, a firm in the current period 1 of (unexpected) intervention (with p1,p0)
will recalculate its optimal path of production and investment by maximizing the present value of
profits as stated in (1), i.e. firms choose y1 and IE1 so as to maximize:
eP = [p y – C (y )] + β[p y – C (y )] – G (IE ) (1)1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 E 1
subject to Y(IE ,IE ) = y + y + y (2)0 1 0 1 2
where β is the risk-adjusted11 discount rate applied to period 2 profits. Firms choose production
and investment in period 1, while production in period 2 becomes endogenously determined by the
total resource constraint (2), as y2 = Y(IE0,IE1)–y0 –y1 and the maximization of (1) can be written
in an unrestricted form in two variables.12 The central motivation for using this simplified framework
is to postulate a particular representation of the supply function that will serve as a starting point
to our econometric specification in the next section. In the same vein, we further discuss the joint
(along with y1) determination of investment effort IE1 (see expression (10) below).
A particular specification of problem (1)–(2) is the case of quadratic costs of production
and investment, which allows a simple representation of the supply function. Assume that marginal
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13. Expression (3) comes from the first order condition w.r.t. y1 which is the simple arbitrage intertemporal condition
(p1 –cy1)–β(pe2 –cy2) = 0 and substituting for y2. The firm chooses the intertemporal allocation of production across periods,
which is simultaneously determined with the decision to invest in period 1 to have more resources and production in period
2 (see expression (10)).
14. From expression (6) it is shown that remaining reserves comes from an identity that suggests that they depend on
past investment efforts (affecting the total resource size Y) and on past production y0.
costs are increasing, i.e. C1 = 0.5cy12; C2 = 0.5cy22, and investment costs depend on the cost of capital
ρE and are also quadratic, i.e. GE(IE1) = 0.5ρEIE12. In this setting, we have from first order conditions
that supply in the current period can be written as,13
∗y = d + d R (3)1 0 1 1
ep –β p1 2
where d = (4)0
c.(1 + β)
β
d = (5)1 (1 + β)
R = Y(IE ,IE )– y (6)1 0 1 0
Expression (3) establishes a linear relationship between production and reserves R (see
e.g. Medlock (2009)) and is a well known consequence of assuming quadratic costs (see e.g.
Pickering (2008)). Given the cost parameter and the discount rate (c, β), the supply of natural gas
in the current period will depend (positively) on current prices and (negatively) on discounted future
prices as well as (negatively) on past cumulative production and (positively) on remaining reserves.
Expressions (4) to (6) also shows that investment effort IE affects endogenously interacts with
current and future production, because is part of a simultaneous decision problem. In expression
(6) we notice that remaining reserves in (at the beginning of) the current period also depend on
investment efforts in exploration in the past period. The official complaint in Argentina about lack
of investment effort in the past as a driver of falling production is well captured by this effect.14
Alternatively, we can write (3) as (7) denoting a negative relationship between current
production and aggregate past production, which again shows the link with the choice of investment
effort IE1.
∗y = ϕ –ϕ y (7)1 0 1 0
ep –βp + β c Y(IE ,IE )1 2 0 1
where ϕ = (8)0
c(1 + β)
β
ϕ = (9)1 (1 + β)
The other first order condition in the maximization problem written in (1) and (2) relates
to the choice of investments in exploration IE1 in the current period. Interior solutions from these
first order conditions again for the quadratic specification are given by,
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15. In our model an increase in capital costs ρE due to higher risk reduces investment without any effect on current
production. An alternative formulation of introducing uncertainty adjusting (reducing) the discount rate has the same effect
but reduces current production. See Bohn and Deacon (2000) where investment (or capital invested per unit of resource) is
negatively related to a risk of expropriation and positively related to future prices, but at the same time current production
is positively related to the risk of expropriation.
β ∂y2∗ eIE = [p – cy ] (10)1 2 2ρ ∂IEE 1
Investment in exploration, which only happens in period 1 in our model is a forward
looking activity that depends on the ratio between the expected discounted cash flow β(p2e –cy2)
and the cost of capital ρE. For this reason, and unlike the case of current production (which depends
on reserves), exploration investment can become arbitrarily low or even zero (i.e. an interior solution
as assumed in (10) is not even guaranteed) if the right hand side of (10) becomes too low or non-
positive. Price expectations of sustained intervention in markets coupled with high capital costs
risks (and expropriation risks, which eventually materialized in early 2012) and sunk investments
may create a situation where investment becomes negligible (with only a symbolic amount due to
contractual obligations to sustain concessions) and current production is positive and declining
(given the absence of investment).15 Our prior is that this is an ingredient of the sample we studied
below that needs to be tested.
One query about the lack of incentives for investment voiced by some analysts in the
Argentine case has been the shortening of the length of concessions and the need to avoid a last-
period syndrome. Thus the call has been for an extension of concessions to overcome the sluggish
behavior of investment and the drop in production. An extension of the concession can be seen as
affecting the investment decision in (10) insofar as is equivalent to an increase in the discount factor
β, implying higher investment. On the other hand, the effect on current production of a higher β is
indeterminate (according to (3)). Thus, the quantitative effect of an extension of concessions in the
production dynamics is an empirical question that needs to be tested.
To sum up, this section provides a simple framework that while capturing some stylized
facts of the Argentine case serves for empirical modeling. Thus, in the next section we take the
relationship between production and cumulative past production (or reserves) represented in (7) (or
(3)) as the logical starting point in our empirical search for the determinants of natural gas production
in Argentina, from which we explore the relevance of several control variables (basin effects, firm
effects, concessions extension, demand effects, etc) related to the hypothesis or effects that have
been mentioned in the introduction. It should be noted that the aim of this paper is to explain the
factors behind the empirical observation of a sustained drop in natural gas production rather than
to proceed to a structural estimation of the model used above, which only serves as a basic theo-
retical framework to organize our search. In fact, the basic equilibrium theory outlined in the
previous model tell us nothing about the alternative specifications or functional forms (where the
linear form of (3) is a rather restrictive one arising from also restrictive assumptions) and about
alternative effects of other control variables (that nevertheless may be related to some of the vari-
ables of the basic model). So empirical modeling should also consider these limitations not as a
nuisance but as something to be completed by the evidence from the data generation process.
3. EMPIRICAL MODELING
Our empirical analysis is based on a data on annual production of NG at the area level,
after an effort to build our data set from detailed raw data provided by the Instituto Argentino del
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16. We had to perform a detailed analysis of the original data set provided by IAPG in order to make consistent the
names of the areas across time, as denominations changed in many cases in the early 1990’s due to new concessions and
the privatization of YPF process.
17. Besides the work on the homogenization of data, and despite the fact that the sample selected is the right one to
represent the “period of interventionism” defined in the analysis of section 2, there were several data limitations at this
stage to the testing of a broad model for the large sample 1993–2013. For instance, key variables such as proven reserves
or exploration efforts (new wells) are available after 1994, and the later variable comes in a different regional aggregation
before 1997. This fact and the extension of the lag we use (3 to 6 years) to capture the effects of exploration efforts, reduces
the sample employed.
18. Proven reserves data are estimates that may oscillate depending on considerations by firms on economically recov-
erable resources from a given reservoir and therefore depend on the economic environment and the influence of regulatory
policies. Cumulative past production is instead a much objective and measurable variable.
19. We include a proxy of the cost of capital for Argentina as expressed by the spread of a reference sovereign bond
over US Treasuries We also used sector specific data on the return on debt for private firms such as Petrobras Argentina.
20. Since 2008 the government implemented the Gas Plus incentive program that selected specific projects in about 40
areas so as to receive a higher price (about twice the average price) in exchange for higher production; see EIA (2012,
pag.7). Not all the approved projects entered into a drilling phase or into production but, by the end of 2012, about 335
wells in 26 areas operated by about 13 firms in all basins in Argentina were part of this program. Most of them were located
in the Neuquina basin.
21. All renegotiations dummies are included in the sample. Being able to distinguish between them we are capable to
look for different cases in case some of them show to be significant. In particular this is the case of the Anticlinal Grande–
Cerro Dragon area in the San Jorge Basin, which has been one of the most commented renegotiations.
Petro´leo y el Gas (IAPG). This basic data was further evaluated and made consistent to allow a
correct identification of the areas across years.16 The original data comes from a panel of annual
production by area from 1993 to 2013. Given that our objective in this paper was to study the drop
since 2004, we use twelve consecutive years of production from 2002 to 2013, which in annual
rates of change reduces the observations to 1298, representing 168 areas.17 The data identifies the
firm that operates the area (there is only one operator per area) and the basin in which is located.
We gathered, from the same source, data on proven reserves and were able to construct
annual aggregate past production for all areas. While data on annual aggregate past production is
very reliable, we found some revisions and therefore instability with the data on proven reserves.18
We thus focus our empirical model on aggregate past production (as in (7)) rather than reserves (as
in (3)). However, as in our testing we express both variables as a ratio in relation to total resources
by area (Y in the notation used in the previous section), both definitions become related and we
explore the sensitivity of results to both definitions. Cumulative past production (or remaining
reserves) are according to the previous model a main variable so as to condition the equation on
production performance.
As investment is an endogenous variable and a determinant of production performance we
explicitly consider its behavior in our empirical modeling. We use a data set on the number of wells
drilled per year for each of the 168 areas as from 1997. To cope with endogenous problems in our
production equation we model investment behavior in a first stage below, where investment depends
on variables suggested by the model of section 2. Investment (as well as production) depends on a
price incentives indicator expressed as the gap between the price of imports of natural gas from
Bolivia and domestic prices received by local producers, the cost of capital19 and the observation
of some special incentives schemes (called “Gas Plus”) for additional production, at higher prices.20
Other variables such as the observation of a renegotiation of area concessions (made between 2007
and 2010) are also included in our data set and in the empirical model.21
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22. This is so because a shift of demand towards the summer has occur in some years, as rationed users in the manu-
facturing sector moved demand to the months where first-served users (residential and commercial) were not active or had
very low demand. The same effect was observed for thermal electricity generators, as (cheaper, or price controlled) natural
gas was available in the summer to avoid use of more expensive liquid fuels. For some observers, this change in the seasonal
pattern of the demand for natural gas had both a cause and a consequence. The cause was the price repressed regime that
led to a strong excess demand scenario particularly visible in cold winters. The consequence was that summer production
tasks in the fields or areas—directed at preparing the areas for the winters—suffered from this shift in demand. Our estimates
below tend to confirm that the seasonal shift in demand had a negative effect on production performance.
To deal with effects attributed to firms or basins, we explicitly test for the additional effects
due to the performance of YPF and Loma-La-Lata (the largest area in Argentina and operated by
YPF). In addition, we include dummies for “large firms” and “medium firms” that capture the
performance of firms different from the largest one (YPF) and that might have been subject to
different expropriation risk.
Finally and although evidence from Figure 1 show that supply and demand behaved in-
dependently with net trade being the result (and therefore caused by both demand and supply), we
account for possible demand shocks or interactions through GDP growth and an indicator of an
(intra-year) shift in demand (towards the summer) that captures demand shocks due to cold win-
ters.22 While GDP growth may be expected to have a positive coefficient, the demand shift effect
is expected to have a negative coefficient since it involves a bottleneck effect in the summer that
detracts production capabilities. Table 1 summarizes the definition of variables.
The specification we adopt to study the drop in natural gas production between 2003 and
2013 is summarized in equation (12), while the investment equation modeled in the first stage is
shown in equation (13). As the explanatory variable in equation (12), we take the logarithm of the
ratio between production in t and production in t-1 in the area i, approximating the annual rate of
change. The independent variables are the log of the ratio between accumulated past production
and total resource endowment followed by the rest of variables and a set of controls defined below.
In the case of investment we instrument it through equation (13) with numbers of wells drilled as
the explained variable, cost of capital and price incentives and other controls (as the GASPLUS
incentive program dummy) capturing across area variability.
y yit 0,itlog = β + β log + β IE + β log(PG ) + β B + β YPF + β LLL (12)0 1 2 i [t–6,t–3] 3 t 4 i 5 i 6 i1 2 1 2y Yi,t–1 it
+ β LF + β MF + β log(GDP /GDP ) + β DEMSHIFT + β RENEG + uˆ7 i 8 i 9 t t–1 10 it 11 it it
y0,itIE = α + α log + . . . + α RENEG + α CP + α GASPLUS + vˆ (13)i [t– 6,t–3] 0 1 10 it 11 t 12 it it1 2Yit
Where (“log” means natural logarithm in (12) and (13))
log(yit/yi,t– 1): Growth rate of area i production in year t.
y0,t: cumulative past production in area i in year t.
Yit = y0,it + Rit: resource size in area i in year t.
Rit: remaining proven reserves in area i in year t
IEit: exploration investment effort in area i from t–3 to t–6.
PGt: Price gap between imported natural gas and domestic.
Bi: dummies for the basin in which the area is located (Austral, San Jorge, NOA).
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23. Results presented in Section 4 remain if we define firms as “majority shareholder” rather than “operators” in our
sample. As some of the firms that operate the areas are not the majority shareholder this distinction may create doubts about
actual incentives. However, results indicate that there is no sensitivity to this redefinition.
YPFi: dummy for YPF (LLL excluded).
LLLi: dummy for Loma de la Lata area.
LFi: dummy if the area is operated23 by a large (top 5) firm (YPF excluded).
MFi: dummy if the area is operated by a medium (top 10) firm (top 5 excluded).
log(GDPt/GDPt – 1): Annual growth of GDP in year t.
DEMSHIFTit: A shift of production to the summer in area i in year t.
RENEGit: a step dummy for areas after a renegotiation (extension) of a concession.
CPt: weight average cost of capital in year t.
GASPLUSit: dummy if the area has projects included in the GASPLUS incentive program.
Expected coefficients are β1,0, β2.0, β3,0 (all according the model of section 2),
β4 = β5 = β6 = 0 (because our prior is that the drop in production is not explained neither by basins
or firms), β7 = β8 = 0 (if there were no differential behavior regarding the size of the firms), β9 = 0
(because we argue that demand effects are not relevant to explain production dynamics in our
sample), β10,0 (because we expect demand shifts be detrimental to productive effort as they
congest production preparation for the winter, made in the summer), and β11 is indeterminate ac-
cording the model in section 2.
Table 1: Definitions and Sources of Variables
Coefficient Variable Definition Source
Production of natural
gas
Quantities in thousands of m3 IAPG
β1 Cumulative production Production between 1991 and t–1 IAPG
β1 Remaining proven
Reserves
Quantities in thousands of m3 at the beginning of
the year
IAPG
β1 Resource size Sum of cumulative production and remaining
proven reserves
IAPG
β2 Exploration Number of exploration and advanced NG wells
drilled between t–6 and t–3
IAPG
β3 Pricing gap with
Bolivian imports
Price gap between imported natural gas and
domestic
Own elaboration
β4 Austral Binary variable, = 1 when the area is located in
Austral basin
IAPG
β4 San Jorge Binary variable, = 1 when the area is located in
San Jorge basin
IAPG
β4 Noroeste Binary variable, = 1 when the area is located in
Noroeste basin
IAPG
β5 YPF Binary variable, = 1 when the area is operated by
YPF (LLL excluded)
IAPG
β6 Loma La Lata (LLL) Binary variable, = 1 when the area is Loma La
Lata
IAPG
β7 Leaders Binary variable, = 1 when the area is operated by
a large (top 5, YPF excluded) firm
IAPG
(continued)
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Table 1: Definitions and Sources of Variables (continued)
Coefficient Variable Definition Source
β8 Medium firms Binary variable, = 1 when the area is operated by
a medium (top 10, top 5 excluded) firm
IAPG
β9 Rate of growth Rate of growth of GDP INDEC/Congress
β10 Demand Shift Quotient between monthly average summer
production (January, February and March) and
monthly maximun production in the year
IAPG
β11 Renegotiations Binary variable, = 1 when the extension of the
area has been renegotiated
IAPG
α11 CP Yearly cost of capital in Argentina Damoradan Online;
BCRA; Mecon
α12 Gas Plus Binary variable, = 1 when the area has projects
included in the Gas Plus incentive program
IAPG
4. RESULTS
We estimate (12) and (13) as a pooling model for 1298 observations covering changes in
production for 168 areas between 2003 and 2013. Tables 2 and 3 report the main results. Results
of testing the production equation (12) with OLS and 2SLS are reported in Table 2 in columns (1)
to (4). The investment equation (13) which is instrumented in a first stage for the previous 2SLS
is reported in Table 3. Variables coefficients are shown in rows.
Table 2 report results of the production equation (12) in the first two columns and repeat
the estimation using remaining reserves instead of aggregate cumulative past production in the last
two columns. The results show no major difference between OLS and 2SLS estimation procedures.
Our main explanatory variable to condition production performance in our reference model of
section 2, namely cumulative past production or remaining reserves, is significant in all specifica-
tions. The constant term—which in our specification (given the chosen dummies) represents the
supply behavior of small firms in the Neuquina Basin that have not renegotiated concessions—is
significant and positive showing that small firms less subjected to expropriation risks have had a
better production performance. Investment effort does not show up as a significant determinant in
our sample, even after a proper instrumentation. Instead, there are other three significant variables
in the empirical model. The first is the “medium size firms” variable reflecting the fact that their
performance was also superior to large firms due to being less exposed to expropriation risks. The
second is the “demand shift” variable that captures a shift in demand (i.e. a less peaked demand
with a shift towards the summer) due to abnormal industrial demand rationing during the winter,
which in turn is a by-product of the disequilibrium caused by the intervention during the sample.
The third is the (positive) renegotiation effect of one important area (Cerrro Drago´n) performed in
2007. These effects survive to across the regressions that either use cumulative past production or
remaining reserves although are sensitive to OLS or 2SLS estimation.
While there are no differences between OLS and 2SLS procedures, the latter is important
insofar as it allows looking at the investment performance equation (13). This is shown in Table 3.
The role of prices in the performance of investment is captured in general (at 5% confidence) by
the price gap between domestic and border prices (which is a time dependent variable similar for
all areas) and across areas by the strong significant effect of the GASPLUS dummy. Our cost of
capital variable (again time varying and similar for all firms, i.e. not capturing different expropriation
Natural Gas Supply Behavior under Interventionism / 35
Copyright q 2015 by the IAEE. All rights reserved.
Table 2: Regression Results for Production Performance, Equation (12)
White SD
2003–2013 Equation (12) With Remain Reserves
Dependent variable: ln(prodt)– ln(prodt – 1) OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
1. Constant 0.52** 0.52** 0.84** 0.84**
2. Cumulative past production –0.16** –0.16**
3. Remain Reserves 0.08** 0.08**
4. Number of Wells Drilled 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.02
5. Pricing gap with Bolivian imports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
6. Basin
a. Austral –0.01 –0.01 –0.03 –0.02
b. San Jorge –0.06 –0.05 –0.06 –0.05
c. NOA –0.18 –0.18 –0.18 –0.18
7. YPF 0.07 0.07 0.04 0.04
a. YPF 2012–2013 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.04
8. Loma La Lata Area 0.02 –0.04 0.04 –0.08
9. Leader Firms 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
10. Medium Firms 0.10* 0.09* 0.08* 0.08 +
11. Rate of growth –1.04 –1.05 –1.01 –1.04
12. Demand Shift –0.72** –0.72** –0.82** –0.83**
13. Renegotiations –0.04 –0.04 –0.07* –0.08*
a. Anticlinal Grande–Cerro Drago´n 0.13** 0.09 0.14** 0.05
13. Year dummies
a. 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes
b. 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes
14. Others dummies
a. San Jorge 2011–2012–2013 Yes Yes Yes Yes
b. NOA 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1298 1298 1298 1298
R squared 0.16 0.16 0.13 0.12
Note: + significant at 10%;* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
24. The dummies report in Table 3 for Large (excluding YPF) and Medium firms show that they have had a better
investment effort performance than YPF, but this does not apply to the Loma La Lata area.
risks) does not show up as significant. Thus, price incentives have been behind the observed low
equilibrium concerning investment decisions.
An important result shown in Tables 2 and 3 is that other often mentioned area-specific
or firm specific reasons for the decline in natural gas production are non-significant, with some
differences observed in the case of investment performance. For example the “YPF effect” and the
“Loma la Lata effect”, both made responsible in many allegations steaming from casual observation
based on descriptive non conditioned statistics of production performance do not appear as signifi-
cant controlling for other variables. What the results tell us is that, while very important, the drop
in production observed for YPF and Loma La Lata are not abnormal or dissimilar with respect to
other areas or firms pointing to a common rather than a particular process. On the other hand,
evidence from the estimated coefficients in the investment performance equation does indicate a
subnormal investment effort of YPF outside (but not inside) Loma La Lata.24
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Table 3: Regression Results for Investment Performance, Equation (13)
2003–2013 Without White SD White SD
Dependent variable: Number of Wells Drilled Production Reserves Production Reserves
1. Constant 0.78 0.69 0.78 0.69
2. Cumulative past production 0.08 0.08**
3. Remain Reserves 0.05 0.05 +
4. Pricing gap with Bolivian imports –0.16* –0.15* –0.16* –0.15*
5. Basin
a. Austral –0.20 + –0.19 –0.20 + –0.19 +
b. San Jorge –0.39** –0.41** –0.39** –0.41**
c. NOA –0.03 –0.03 –0.03 –0.03
6. YPF –0.13 –0.09 –0.13 + –0.09
a. YPF 2012–2013 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11
7. Loma La Lata Area 6.87** 6.88** 6.87** 6.88**
8. Leader Firms 0.46** 0.43** 0.46** 0.43**
9. Medium Firms 0.36** 0.37** 0.36** 0.37**
10. Rate of growth 2.32 2.32 2.32 2.32
11. Demand Shift 0.17 0.27 0.17 0.27*
12. Renegotiations 0.19 0.21 + 0.19 0.21
a. Anticlinal Grande–Cerro Drago´n 4.02** 4.02** 4.02** 4.02**
13. WACC –5.37 –5.34 –5.37 –5.34
14. Gas Plus 1.11** 1.11** 1.11** 1.11**
15. Year dummies
a. 2003 Yes Yes Yes Yes
b. 2009 Yes Yes Yes Yes
16. Others dummies
a. San Jorge 2011–2012–2013 Yes Yes Yes Yes
b. NOA 2011 Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1298 1298 1298 1298
R squared 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31
Note: + significant at 10%;* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.
25. Most of the concessions of areas in Argentina were granted by the federal government, dated from the deregulation
and privatization of the early 90s and its time horizon was not approaching a last period. Even so they were judged as prone
to be extended by the new concession authorities (Provinces) that emerged from the implementation of a constitutional
reform in the mid 90s. Thus, a few areas (including the largest one Loma de la Lata) extended its concession period before
2007 and some more did so since 2007.
Our estimations also allow us to test for another often mentioned—particularly in the
energy business community—effect for natural gas production drop in Argentina, namely the (ab-
sence of) renegotiation of concessions extensions.25 In the simple model of section 2 extensions
may be seen as enlarging the horizon of decisions and (for given a discount rate) may increase the
marginal benefit of investment and production in the future. But this inter-temporal allocation of
production effort makes the effect on current production ambiguous. In our results in Table 2, the
renegotiation dummies effect on the rate of change of natural gas production are in general non-
significant, except for the Anticlinal Grande–Cerro Dragon area. Thus, our results suggest that this
area was underperforming until it renegotiated its concession in 2007, to become more dynamic
after that year. A similar result is confirmed in the investment performance equation in Table 3.
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26. At the beginning of 2013 the government proposed a new incentive scheme to firms so as to pay differential prices
for the production of natural gas above an agreed declining path, with prices substantially above those regulated in recent
years. The advantage of YPF was twofold in terms of being the first to sign such an agreement and being in a favorable
position to overcome doubts about the time inconsistency of such proposal (given that natural gas prices paid by customers
remained at very low levels and those higher prices offered to firms would depend on government subsidies). Another
advantage of YPF was the preferential access to foreign currency, in a macroeconomic regime were firms have no open
access and are constrained by hard capital controls to make external payments (including dividends). One fundamental
reason behind these advantages has to do with the blurred separation between regulators and YPF, as energy authorities are
members of the board, receive fees for their participation and show themselves completely side by side with the executive
branch of the firm.
Finally another important testing is to see whether the nationalization of YPF has changed
the performance behavior of the firm. While there is ample evidence that this is happening in
Argentina our results do not capture such change, perhaps due to the frequency (annual) of our
sample. YPF started in 2013 to perform better than the rest of the sector and this has happened
amidst strong government support both in terms of incentives for additional production and access
to hard currency.26 Mirroring this improvement was a deterioration of the performance of other
large firms leading to an extension of the drop in aggregate production in the two years after
nationalization. The results do not allow us to capture such change and instead suggest that at an
aggregate level the depressed-incentives regime that originated after the 2002 had not been reversed
in 2013.
5. CONCLUSIONS
The main result of this paper is that the drop in natural gas production experienced by
Argentina can indeed be modeled from a basic standard theory approach, which is the natural setting
to start exploring the significance of other often cited explanations attributed to firms, areas, rene-
gotiation of concessions. The role of past investment is considered in our framework and although
it is endogenously determined it can nevertheless suggest a similar explanation. Our results are
clear enough on the scant evidence in favor of firm-specific or area-specific effects that may suggest
abnormal behavior and on the relative low power on production dynamics on renegotiations-with-
out-economic-signals. The investment performance reinforces the evidence that is pretty much
consistent with the deleterious effect of very low price signals on an already mature conventional
gas pattern. Past investment efforts are present insofar as they determine the dimension of the natural
gas resource base at the beginning of an interventionist era that is still in place. Whatever the
mismatch between forecasted and accomplished required investments in the years previous to the
interventionist era, the fierce control of prices and market transactions validated ex-post any over-
conservative attitude towards investment in the natural gas upstream. The results are robust to the
YPF nationalization decision of 2012, showing that the central features of our empirical model did
not suffer from that change. With our sample ending in 2013 we cannot detect a change in the
relative performance of YFP vis a` vis the rest of the firms that reflects the changed incentives after
nationalization. The recent move towards non-conventional gas with substantially higher prices is
a central part of this incipient change.
We think that while the results of this paper are already robust enough to contribute to the
understanding of the causes behind the drop in natural gas production in the 2000s in Argentina,
they have also opened suggested lines of research to improve the modeling of production perfor-
mance in recent years. One has to do with the interpretation of the observed phenomena in Argentina
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as a process related to a foretold nationalization/expropriation. A more detailed analysis of the
decision and performance before and after the expropriation decisions and the asymmetric behavior
of YPF and other large firms may be accomplished using the framework and testing the predictions
of models such as that of Bohn and Deacon (2000). A second line has to do with the interpretation
of this process as part of a political equilibrium (such as that modeled in Kawamura, 2013). Finally
another promising line is to model the restoration of price signals in 2013 as part of a transition to
unconventional resources, understood as a technical change in the sector that may redefine future
resources.
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